Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

CTBT

On 24^th September 1966, at UN headquarters in New York. 65 countries including declared five nuclear powers, the United States, China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as commitment to step nuclear test explosions.

The significance of this treaty is that it prevents any further significant development of nuclear weapons states and the so called threshold states, Pakistan, India and Israel. But it is also a tremendous step forward in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Nuclear testing been looked upon the most of the world as underscoring the discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation regime, which allowed the nuclear weapon stats to retain their weapon and continue to improve them while the rest of the world was precluded by the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) from engaging in any nuclear weapon programme.

On16th July 1945 CTBT began in the deserts of New Mexico with the Trinity test – the first nuclear test in history. Almost immediately, scientists and others began discussing banning further tests of nuclear weapons. The last two and a half years of test ban negotiation have been particularly excruciating as they have had to go through the 38 nations Conference on Disarmament (CD). In January 1994, the CD took up negotiations of a Comprehensive test ban treaty, and it has a long difficult process. There was substantial opposition in the CD to concluding the comprehensive test ban. The pace was largely set by the nuclear weapon states, many of which opposed the test ban.

At the same time it was fighting off obstacle at the CD, the administration had to conduct rear guard actions here at home. There was substantial opposition to the treaty by certain elements in the administration.

Once it be came clear that the nuclear weapon states were, in fact, going to approve the treaty arose from a new quarter; India wrapped itself in the flag of disarmament in order to conceal its even nuclear ambitions. In the last few months of the CD negotiations, India complained that the treaty did not go for enough, that it did not prohibit laboratory experiments and that it did not commit the nuclear weapon states to a time, bound frame work for nuclear disarmament; that is a series of set dates by which certain nuclear disarmament goals would be met, leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapon.

India said the nuclear weapon states were practicing nuclear apartheid, keeping nuclear weapons among a select club and prohibiting the rest of the world from getting them. This argument has a certain appeal because there is tremendous resistance to the idea that certain states should be able to maintain huge arsenals of nuclear weapons while denying the same weapon to other states.

There is a sense at the CD the nuclear weapon states, particularly the United States and Russia, practice an arrogance in regards to their own nuclear arsenals and are moving much too slowly towards the elimination of these weapon. The United States and the other nuclear weapon states have pledged under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to take action towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Many of the countries in the CD are unhappy with the progress that is being made.

So India’s arguments, however transparent, and a certain resonance. Fortunately, most of the countries of the CD saw through these arguments had opposed India’s efforts to kill the treaty. Unfortunately; the CD is run by consensus not by majority vote. Every member has to agree to a treaty because it can reported out of the CD. India refused to agree to the treaty as well as to a report from CD saying that it could not come to an argument. The CD ended in August 96, without successfully concluding the treaty or conveying the treaty to the UN.

In an unusual wave, Australia brought the CTBT treaty straight to the United Nations, overcoming some procedural objections along the way and rallying a surprisingly strong 127 co-sponsors for their resolutions to adopt the treaty. The only three countries voting against the treaty were India, Bhutan, which is a virtual colony of India; and Libya.

There were objections voted along the way. Most important was India’s objection. It said this treaty would never come into force; they would never sign this treaty. And Pakistan, which voted in favour of the treaty, indicated that it would not sign the treaty under existing conditions, widely interpreted to mean that it would be unable to sign unless India signed. Security concerns of both India and Pakistan can be addressed over the next few years that eventually India and Pakistan can be brought in this treaty.

There have been 2046 nuclear explosions over the last 51 years. That averages one nuclear explosion every nine days. The U.S. has set off a nuclear explosion the equivalent of once every 17 days during that time. It is very likely that there will not be another U.S. nuclear explosion. It is quite likely that there will not be another explosion in the world period.

By signing this treaty, the nuclear weapon states assume the obligation to do nothing that would obstruct the purpose and object of the treaty. The Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties obligates states to uphold treaties they have signed while they wait their entry into force.

CTBT banned nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, underwater and in space. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty limited underground nuclear weapon tests, including explosions, to 150 kilometers. With the CTBT negotiating record, it is clear that the treaty bans not only nuclear explosion, but any nuclear energy release from a nuclear explosion. It bans 150 kilograms of high-explosive release, which is the amount of yield from the hydronuclear tests the United States Conducted during the moratorium from 1958 to 1961. The negotiating record is clear, not even 1 gram of energy released from a nuclear explosion is permitted.

On the other hand, there are activities that look like nuclear tests which are permitted. AT least they look like a nuclear test until the big explosive is set off, but nothing nuclear happens. These so called cold tests cannot be conducted by the non-nuclear weapons states under the NPT, but they are permitted to the nuclear –weapon states. In fact, these could be accomplished as full-scale tests. A gun type nuclear weapon can be loaded with uranium 238- from which one cannot make a working bombs instead of uranium 235 and fired. An implosion type weapon could also be loaded which uranium 235. Every thing goes at it would in a working nuclear weapon but there is no energy release at all.

Under CTBT, inertial confinement fusion experiments are permitted to all. These involve buildings full of losers or particles accelerators that implode a tiny pellet of  nuclear material with the aim of reaching explosions would give may be 1 to 10 tons of energy release, but it is required very often, more than once a second, in order to mimic an ordinary power plant. But we are far from actually achieving even the break even point or the commercial feasibility of inertial confinement fusion.

Critics on CTBT say that the treaty is couched in feeble and uninspiring language to cater the interests of the nuclear weapon states. It should have contained a clear and unambiguous commitment of nuclear weapon within a time frame.

The next gave rise to the impression that the nuclear weapon states desired the preservation of the status quo, where in they maintain their exclusive monopoly of nuclear weaponry. The draft of the CTBT seriously flamed.

The United States and its nuclear allies alone passes the required technology to conduct such tests. India, which has refused to sign the treaty, has used both arguments in favour and of its refusal. M .Arundhati Ghash, Indian representative at CD, rejected the draft proposal on the ground that “CTBT is an instrument against horizontal proliferation”. Since India is interested in horizontal proliferation (and this is with Pakistan’s regional concern is), it took refuge behind an idealistic time bound ultimate objective of complete nuclear disarmament to avoid signing the CTBT. That is why India is opposed to Entry into Force provisions and also rejected a bilateral test ban treaty Pakistan prepared in 1987.

Pakistan has done will to declare that “any step of nuclear escalation in its region will find a matching response by Pakistan to safeguard its security… we will not accept unilateral obligations and commitments”.  However by supporting the CTBT in UN Assembly Pakistan to abstain in the voting.

India preached disarmament to others, it practiced the opposite. India’s two track approach suited both the superpower for reasons of their own interests. The Soviet Union (now Russian Federation) had a treaty relationship with India. The United States preferred to look the other way for economic and diplomatic reasons.

India exploited its ambivalent policy and nuclear ambiguity during the cold war environment to acquire the military muscles it derived. It testes a nuclear device in 1974 and embarked upon getting a multifaceted missile capability. In the perception of India the possession of the nuclear weapons and their delivery system was necessary it to claim its share in the global power cake.

India says that CTBT is not acceptable because it hurts the self-esteem of the developing countries and would lead to lower economic growth by doing so.

 Pakistan has accepted a moral obligation. It would have been batter for Pakistan to abstain in the voting.