Banning Ballistic Missiles

After decades of diplomatic wrangling breakthroughs have come on many fronts, both bilateral and multilateral. Not only have soviets and now Russians joined Americans in agreements to make massive reductions in strategic arms, but the overwhelming majority of nations have signed on to indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPD). Leaders in Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus have greatly contributed to the non- proliferation regime by returning thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia for safekeeping and elimination, a process to be completed this fall with the departure of the last few warheads from Belarus.

The Conventional Foreseen Europe Treaty has ratified and reinforced the transformation of the military balance on the continent, although the altered political landscape after the collapse of the Soviet empire will require nettlesome changes in its provisions. The long sought Chemical Weapons Convention should enter into force shortly, and, despite India’s recalcitrance, a comprehensive nuclear test ban enjoys nearly universal support.

The Clinton administration’s shortcomings are of a different kind. The president’s team is well staffed with experienced talent in the field of arms control, and its experts have followed through commendably on the work of their predecessors. That is especially true of their efforts to salvage the START agreements and protect the non-proliferation regime by persuading several former Soviet republics to give up their nuclear arsenals.

A NUMBER of present or foreseeable agreements, while by no means guaranteeing an end to violence between their parties, can enhance deterrence by impeding surprise attack and increasing the likelihood that potential victims will have time to bolster their deafness. As a first step to lengthen the fuse on possible nuclear strikes, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty removed intermediate-range ballistic and ground launched cruise missiles from the superpower inventories in Europe. While submarine launched ballistic missiles remain central to mutual deterrence, the United States and Russia have undertaken to remove nuclear weapons from their surface fleets (much to the satisfaction of naval officers, who considered such weapons unlikely to be unable and a waste of precious storage space for conventional weapons). Tactical nuclear weapons have been with drawn from forward development in Central Europe, with NATO retaining only a modest number of air deliverable theater nuclear weapons to balance residual capabilities in Russia.

In the meantime Moscow and Washington have assured each other that they have “detargeted” their missile that is, stopped aim in them at each other and have lowered the alert status of their strategic forces, signaling that neither plans an attack. Those changes are sensible and welcome, but they are too easily reversed to have more than symbolic value. Far more is required in bilateral accords to realize the potential for strengthening stability in the military balance and the behavior of states. To offer maximum reassurance that they are turning away from reliance on nuclear options and to demonstrate dramatically their commitment to non-proliferation, the United States and Russia should take nuclear warheads off delivery vehicles and store them under mutual surveillance to prevent their covert return to active service.

Needless to say, applying the escrow principle to all US and Russian strategic forces would require early participation in similar arraignments by Britain, China, and France, the other nuclear power. Indeed, the current START agreements, if implemented, carry the two major powers to force levels at which further progress would depend on engaging those governments. With strategic deployments ranging from fewer than 300 warheads ( China) to slightly more than 500 (France), those countries should find an intermediate escrow stage more acceptable than a requirement that they destroy portions of their more meagre forces. Though slower than the timetable India demands for the nuclear have to give up their arsenals, escrow would maximize incentives for New Delhi to modify its hostility to a test ban and accept restraints on the covert nuclear programs in India, Pakistan, and Israel.

Co-operation between American and Russian military professionals has come a long way. For some years hence it could well be wise to encourage the Russian military to retain custody of the nuclear materials now in warheads. The straightforward way to do that is to leave the materials in the weapons and subject those weapons to the strictest possible scrutiny. Strategic escrow is a practical means of preventing dispersal of the raw materials of nuclear weapons into less trustworthy hand.

In the Navy’s case, giving up sea-launched ballistic missiles, the pillars of stable deterrence, would be wrenching, but doing so would not require abandoning its favorite strategic platforms. In the Persian Gulf War, submarines performed outstandingly as cruise missile launchers, and they could remain in service for the purpose. In that capacity they would be valuable complements to so called “arsenal ships” the navy is now exploring as advanced technology systems for launching hundreds of cruise missiles or other weapons. All these considerations suggest that trends the build – down has already set in motion could lead the armed services to support a ballistic missile ban.

CONCERN OVER acquisition of long range missile capabilities by the rogue regimes of  North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya fuels much on the congressional interest in rapid erection of strategic deafness. Intelligence estimates rate the possibility of intercontinental missile threats from those quarters as slender and long term. Yet threats of such uncertain nature and timing oblige policy makers to consider all options, including the provocative possibility of pre-emptive strikes against incipient missile development programs. Such preventive action would become both more workable and more legitimate once Americans and Russians agreed to a co-operative approach on banning ballistic missiles.